Rehabilitating Observation: The Persistence of Observational Documentary in the Age of Post-Truth Politics by Rebekka Jensen, Nanna









Rehabilitating Observation: The Persistence  
of Observational Documentary in the  
Age of Post-Truth Politics 
Nanna Rebekka Jensen 





Abstract | With the postmodernist realignment of our epistemological foundations,          
contemporary documentary has come to be marked by the idea that problematizing            
the relationship with the real is inherently good and progressive, and that the core              
quality of contemporary documentary has come to be its suspicion towards its own             
relationship to the real (Steyerl 2011; Rangan 2014; Takahashi 2015). In a time,             
which the assertion of the indiscernibility between fact and fiction has been            
appropriated by discourses of power I will argue that the facticity of reality needs our               
attention and care more than our suspicion. Thus, following philosophical proposals           
for a new empiricism (Latour 2004; Haraway 1988), and a Bazinian ontologization of             
cinema (Bazin 2005a, 2005b), I will argue for the persistence of observational            
documentary and a new critical realism set in ​the vein of contemporary observational             
documentary practises like ​Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel’s ​Leviathan         
(2012) and Kevin Jerome Everson’s ​Tonsler Park​ (2017). 
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Documentary cinema is characterized by an unsurpassed frequency with which it           
reflects on its relationship to truth (Nichols 1991; Balsom 2017b). On one hand, the              
filmic images’ supposed indexical relation to the profilmic reality – guaranteed by the             
process of lens-based capture – is thought to shape our fundamental expectations to             
what documentary is (Nichols 1991, 27). On the other hand indexical status of the              
image simultaneously, gives rise to the question of how much reality has been             
distorted in this process (Cowie 2011, 2, 20). Thus, the notion of indexicality not only               
comes to define the dominant expectations to the documentary image, it also invests             
documentary with ethical problems and epistemological anxiety. In other words, it           
introduces the technical and ultimately philosophical question: does the documentary          
image lie, or does it tell the truth? (Cowie 2011, 8). Exactly because of this inherent                
paradox, documentary images have been subject to chronic suspicion (Nichols 1991,           
32–33; Rangan 2014, 2; Balsom 2017b). However, with the poststructuralist refusal           
of essential truths, we seemed to have entered a time in which truth on screen has                
been lost for good. 
In her essay, ​Documentary Uncertainty​, Hito Steyerl writes that: “The only thing we             
can say for sure about the documentary mode in our times is that we always already                
doubt if it is true”(Steyerl 2011, n.p.). To Steyerl, the perpetual doubt that what we               
see is “true”, “real” and “factual” that accompanies contemporary documentary          
reception is not a shameful weakness for documentary. On the contrary, Steyerl            
points to this uncertainty as the only certain and reliable concept in a current time               
marked by the poststructuralist destabilization of notions like “truth” and “reality”           
(Steyerl 2011). Hence, according to Steyerl, contemporary documentary’s inherent         
uncertainty, doubt and ambiguity function as a means to articulate the “fundamental            
dilemma of contemporary risk societies” and thus constitute the core quality of            
contemporary documentary modes of filmmaking (Steyerl 2011, n.p.). Steyerl’s view          
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(Baudrillard 2000)and insists on the rhetorical nature of truth (Foucault 1997; Derrida            
1997). By foregrounding the contingent and historically contextualized character of          
all truth-claims, poststructuralist critique has sought to undercut claims to universal           
truths. 
However, within the last decades, this suspicion towards any essentialist notions of            
truth has been slowly appropriated by hegemonic power formations that have           
transformed a critical practice into a straw man attack on truth itself (Thail et al.               
2018; Higgins 2016; Sismondo 2017). Today, the concept of truth, once a site for              
critical investigation, seems to have eroded with the alleged ​collapse of reality            
(Baudrillard 2000). Thus, the rise of post-truth politics, fake news as well as cultural              
and value relativism in the West all testify to a new epistemological crisis             
characterized by a pervasive devaluation of truth (D’Ancona 2017; Ball 2017; Davis            
2017; Rose 2017; Thail et al. 2018). Recently, it has been proposed that the              
emergence of the “post-truth”-era ​has brought about a Columbus’ egg for the            
problem of documentary representation. In a round-up article titled “The best           
documentaries of 2016: cinematic nonfiction in the year of nonfact” published in            
Sight & Sound in April 2017, filmmaker Robert Greene programmatically declares           
that with the pervasive devaluation of truth, documentary can once and for all give up               
its “long, Quixotic quest to properly display Truth [​sic​] onscreen […] the era of              
post-truth documentary is manifest​[1]​” (Greene 2017, n.p.). As a documentary          
practice that stresses the nonintervention of the filmmaker, eschews commentary          
and accords primacy to lens-based capture​[2] (Nichols 1991, 38–44), observational          
documentary emerges as a prime target for poststructuralist suspicion. Accused of a            
renunciation of its own mediation and subjectivisms, the observational mode comes           
to be marked as epistemologically naïve and not sufficiently reflexive (Trinh 2013;            
Williams 1993; Marcus 1990; Kiener 2006). As Erika Balsom notes: “To examine the             
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is to encounter a deep and pervasive suspicion of its relationship to the real and,               
more particularly, a robust rejection of its observational mode” (Balsom 2017b, n.p.). 
Against the polemical contestation of the observational documentary and the idea of            
a ​post-truth ​documentary that has lost its faith in representation and given up its              
claim to represent truth on screen, I suggest that we ask whether the observational              
documentary’s claim to actuality through lens-based capture and an ethics of           
attunement can be a fertile site for a production of truth in an age of ​post-truth                
politics​. Thus, following Erika Balsom’s essay, “The Reality-Based Community”         
(Balsom 2017b), I will revisit the discourse regarding documentary’s relationship to           
truth and the rejection of its observational mode. The purpose of this essay is not to                
disallow previous critique of the observational mode, which I believe has been both             
legitimate and innovative. By contrast, the purpose of this essay is to break with a               
simplified and teleological conception of documentary that sees observational and          
reflexive modes as opposing methodologies for representing reality and engaging          
with the production of truth (Rangan 2014). With reference to Haraway and Latour’s             
different critiques of postmodernist critique (Haraway 1988; Latour 2004), I suggest           
that we re-evaluate the efficacy of previous postmodernist representational         
strategies. Building on their proposals for “feminist” and “second” empiricism          
(Haraway 1988, 580; Latour 2004, 232) I will argue for the persistence of             
observational documentary practices in our current moment. Recalling André Bazin’s          
ontology of the photographic image (Bazin 2005a) , I will argue for an ontology of               
cinema, in which cinema offers a reparative relation to an embattled real.            
Furthermore, Bazin’s notion of ​integral realism ​(Bazin 2005b, 87), will be introduced            
as a way to conceptualise contemporary observational documentary as a mode of            
representation that is traversed by reflexivity rather than opposed to it.   
By making an argument for observational documentary as a site for the production of              
truth, I engage with a notion that is hard to delimit and talk about. My aim is not to                   
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examine how the challenging notion of truth can be addressed through contemporary            
observational documentary practices. Countering the strain of formally reflexive         
documentaries characteristic to the “documentary turn” in contemporary art (Lind and           
Steyerl 2008, 11; Takahashi 2015; Enwezor 2004), recent ​artists’ practices display a            
reconceived commitment to the observational mode and assert the primacy of           
lens-based capture. These practises include seminal works affiliated with Harvard          
Sensory Ethnography Lab (SEL) such as ​People's Park (J.P. Sniadecki and Libbie            
Dina Cohn 2012), an eighty-minute long tracking shot through an urban park in             
Chengdu, China, ​MANAKAMANA (Stephanie Spray and Pacho Velez 2013), a film           
set entirely within a cable car above the Nepali jungle and ​Leviathan (Véréna             
Paravel and Lucien Castaing-Taylor 2012), a portrait of a world at sea shot primarily              
on GoPro camera’s strapped to the fishermen’s labouring bodies and the massive            
vessel. Other practices that reengage with the observational mode include the works            
of artists and filmmakers like Wang Bing, Rosalind Nashashibi, Ben Rivers, Ben            
Russel, Salomé Lamas, Eric Badelaire and Kevin Jerome Everson. Despite their           
vast differences, I will argue that all of these practices seek to engage in a sphere of                 
representation beyond – and, indeed, in opposition to – mass media by means of              
lens-based capture. Rather than pursuing any kind of essentialist truth waiting out            
there to be captured, these films engage in a production of an intersubjective truth              
from a situated, reflexive perspective; the embodied encounter with what James           
Agee has called “the cruel radiance of what is” (Agee and Evans 2001, 9). 
  
The Battlefields of Epistemology 
In this essay, I will examine how the observational mode of documentary filmmaking             
partakes in the creation of truth. One way to go about this task could be to start with                  
a comprehensive definition of the terms truth and documentary. However, I will            
refrain from doing so. On one hand, poststructuralist thinking has already thoroughly            
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troubled surface of water” (Steyerl 2011, n.p.). On the other hand, documentary            
theory – more than ninety years after John Grierson introduced the term in his 1926               
review of Robert Flaherty’s ​Moana (1926)​[3] – still struggles to find a satisfactory             
definition of the term (Stallabrass 2013, 14; Ribas 2016). Therefore, in Steyerl’s            
words, I will not attempt to perform “an exercise of Negative theology” and reiterate              
all the definitions that the documentary mode and the notion truth fail to live up to                
(Steyerl 2011, n.p.). Rather, I will try to trace how documentary’s claim to truth              
changes concurrently with a change in the notion of truth. Citing Brian Winston in              
Claiming the Real (1995), I will consider how disputes on the status and production              
of truth and knowledge have been fought on the “battlefields of epistemology” that             
constitute the field of documentary (Winston 1995, 242). 
As reflected in many recent discussions on documentary theory and practice, the            
anxiety regarding documentary’s claim to truth has existed since the inception of the             
documentary form (Balsom 2017b; Balsom and Peleg 2016; Steyerl 2011). Thus,           
John Grierson’s founding definition of documentary as “the creative treatment of           
actuality” is reiterated throughout contemporary literature to emphasize that the          
dialectic tension between truth and falsity, realism and constructivism, representation          
and reflexivity has been around since the founding of the genre (Balsom and Peleg              
2016, 13; Balsom 2017a; Rangan 2014, 2; Trinh 2013, 85). Despite this apparent             
awareness, canonical documentary theory, perhaps best exemplified in Bill Nichols’          
extensive work, has depicted the history of the documentary as a teleological            
development towards greater suspicion of documentary’s truth claim (Nichols 1991,          
32–75; Rangan 2014, 2). In ​Representing Reality​, Nichols identifies four          
documentary modes: the expository mode, the observational mode, the participatory          
mode and the reflexive mode[4] (Nichols 1991, 32). Nichols defines documentary           
modes as “basic ways of organizing texts in relation to certain recurrent features or              
conventions” (Nichols 1991, 32). According to Nichols, these various         
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filmmakers become aware of the epistemological or ethical constraints of the           
previous modes[5] (Nichols 1991, 32). Nichols ties the observational mode to           
ethnographic film and the technological innovations of the 1950s and 1960s, which            
facilitated new, flexible and increasingly unobtrusive approaches to record and          
represent reality with presumably little interference from the filmmaker​[6]​. These          
technological developments gave rise to various film movements such as ​Direct           
Cinema ​in the United States and Canada, ​Free Cinema ​in Britain, and ​cinéma-vérité             
in France (MacDonald 2013, 2; Tay 2008, 8). In overall terms, the predominant             
discourse on observational cinema has (sometimes perhaps unintentionally)        
contributed to a conception of observational documentary as a mode that strived            
towards a “fly-on-the-wall” neutrality and objectivity[7] (Cowie 2011, 20). 
These unconscious conventions of objectivity and evidence have historically         
invested the observational documentary with the “impression of authentic truth”          
(Rangan 2014, 2). However, under the impact of semiotics and poststructuralist           
thought, it became increasingly untenable to assert transparent truths, objective          
knowledge and a reality outside of discourse (Winston 1995, 242). Through his            
notion of a “politics of truth”, Michel Foucault argues that truth is produced by a form                
of exercising power that confines in advance what does and does not count as truth               
and what kind of knowledge we accept as the given field of knowledge (Foucault              
1997, 32; Butler 2006). As Steyerl asserts, a paradox arose when the concepts used              
to define and legitimate the documentary form (“truth”, “reality” and “objectivity”) lost            
their transparency and turned out to be “dubious, debatable and risky” (Steyerl 2011,             
n.p.). Thus, Winston concludes, the postmodernist concern with truth “transforms          
‘actuality’ […] from a legitimation into an ideological burden” (Winston 1995, 243). 
This postmodern epistemological realignment provoked a crisis for documentary in          
witch observational documentary became a prime target for critique (Balsom 2017b;           
Steyerl 2011a; Winston 1995). A part of the crisis was the awareness that             
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narratives in images, sounds and language; it partakes in the construction and            
deployment of discourses about reality (Cowie 2011, 49–50; Steyerl 2003). The           
consensus concerning documentary as an ideological commentary on the world is           
heavily indebted to Bill Nichols’ articulation of documentary’s kinship to the so-called            
“discourses of sobriety”, i.e. the positivist discourses of domains like science,           
economics, education and politics (Nichols 1991, 3; Rangan 2014, 2; Cowie 2011,            
2). According to Nichols, these discourses “regard their relationship to the real as             
direct, immediate, transparent” (Nichols 1991, 4). Not far off from the notion of             
“politics of truth”, Nichols describes the discourses of sobriety as “the vehicles of             
domination and conscience, power and knowledge, desire and will” (Nichols 1991,           
4). According to Pooja Rangan, the juxtaposition of documentary and discourses of            
sobriety have offered analytical tools to criticize the unconscious conventions of           
objectivity and evidence that have historically invested documentary with the          
“impression of authentic truth” (Rangan 2014, 2). Through this articulation, the           
poststructuralist critique of modernity migrated to the documentary tradition. 
Within this poststructuralist episteme, the observational documentary mode emerges         
as a ​bad object​[8]​. Accused of a renunciation of its own mediation and subjectivisms,              
the observational mode is deemed epistemologically naïve, voyeuristic and a means           
for domination (Nichols 2017, 38–44, 133; Trinh 1991, 1992; Williams 1993). In            
“Documentary Is/Not a Name”, Trinh describes documentary as a commodity that           
“set a ​value on intimate observation and ​assess its worth according to how well it               
succeeds in capturing reality on the run” (Trinh 2013, 69 italics original). Through the              
use of location recordings, synchronized sounds, minimal use of montage and           
wide-angle shots, the observational documentary has developed a manipulative         
aesthetic ​of objectivity and ​technology ​of truth through which the documentary           
makes claims to capture and present reality – with direct inscription as a guarantee              
of truth (Trinh 2013, 69). At the core of this strategy, she claims, is a Cartesian                
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filmmaker-versus-other, truth-versus-false. In this worldview, the filmmaker is placed         
in a position of power and authority over the production of meaning regarding the              
object of their film. Yet, this position of power is either rendered invisible by referring               
to the unmediated nature of the documentary or deemed irrelevant as an            
inescapable part of gathering evidence (Trinh 2013, 69f). What is presented in these             
documentaries is, however, not the real but a “repetitive, artificial resurrection of the             
real” which has proved itself ​overpoweringly successful in “substituting its visual and            
verbal signs ​of ​the real ​for the real” (Trinh 2013, 71, emphasis added). Hereby, Trinh               
suggests a situation in which the observational documentary, in its attempt to reflect             
reality, ends up endangering the referent. 
For documentary, the postmodern rise of reflexivity causes both an interrogation of            
the truth claims of individual documentary films as well as a self-conscious critical             
stance towards the mechanisms at work within the genre as a whole. In her              
landmark 1993 text, “Mirrors without Memories: Truth, History, and the New           
Documentary”, Linda Williams points to how documentary had entered a “permanent           
state of the self-reflexive crisis of representation” (Williams 1993, 10). In her text,             
Williams brings out The Rodney King Trial (1992) as an event that seems to              
epitomize the transition from a modern positivist episteme to a postmodern reflexive            
one. To recall the event, in March 1991 Rodney King, a twenty-five-year-old black             
man, was stopped by the Los Angeles Police after a high-speed chase and was              
pulled out of his car. A nearby amateur cameraman, George Holliday, recorded on             
video how King was kicked and beaten repeatedly by police officers in an attack that               
resulted in skull fractures, permanent brain damage as well as broken bones and             
teeth (Sastry and Bates 2017). Despite the fact that the brutal beating was caught on               
video, in 1992, the officers were acquitted from their charges of “excessive use of              
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The King Trial called forth the tension between the ​material authenticity of film and              
video recordings and these recording’s potentially limited ​documentary value​. Thus,          
it was brought out by documentary theorists to reflect on contemporary anxieties on             
the many ways in which photographic images’ seemingly self-evident truths can be            
undermined (Williams 1993, 10; Cowie 2011, 26; Nichols 1994, 17–42; Butler 1993).            
To Williams, the Rodney King Trial illustrates the contradictory role of documentary            
images in the postmodern era (Williams 1993, 10). This crisis called for a             
rejuvenation of the documentary. Williams’ solution is not to abandon the quest for             
documentary truth, which has always been the “receding goal of the documentary            
tradition” (Williams 1993, 14). Rather, what she suggests is that the “new            
documentary” of the postmodern era accepts that these truths “cannot be           
transparently represented” (Williams 1993, 13). Documentary truth, Williams claims,         
can only be achieved through strategies of construction and staging (Williams 1993,            
12). This entails leaving behind observational mode and its “self-obscuring voyeur of            
vérité realism” and instead turning to reflexivity, artifice and performativity to engage            
with what she identifies as a “a newer, more contingent, relative, postmodern truth”             
(Williams 1993, 11). 
As Maria Lind and Hito Steyerl have noted, documentary practices from the 1990s             
and onward have tended to offer “sceptical and subversive readings of documentary            
jargons of authenticity” (Lind and Steyerl 2008a, 14). One example is Werner            
Herzog’s call for an “ecstatic truth” which is only through accessible “fabrication and             
imagination” (Herzog 1999). Another example is Errol Morris’ critically acclaimed ​The           
Thin Blue Line (1988) about a man who is wrongfully accused of murder. In the film                
Morris’ uses highly expressionistic reenactments of different witnesses' versions of          
the murder to call the certainty of events surrounding the murder case into question.              
Thus in 2000, Robert Stam notes that: “in contemporary post-modernist era           
reflexivity is the norm rather than the exception” (Stam 2000, 152). Today,            




Nanna Rebekka Jensen 
Rehabilitating Observation 
4 - 10 (36) 







expose their distance from “the real” and the idea that problematizing the relationship             
to the real is something inherently good (Lind and Steyerl 2008b, 14–15; Balsom             
2017b; Stam 2000, 152). According to Rangan, these practices are oriented by            
certain narratives in which “seriousness” is considered the opposite of realism           
(Rangan 2014, 1). This means that documentaries that, stage the vanishing           
difference between representation and the real, or question the possibility of           
documentary representation, are seen as more progressive and sophisticated and          
are therefore granted the cultural privileges of intellectual weight, institutional          
recognition and symbolic (or even economic) capital (Rangan 2014, 1). 
  
Towards a New Empiricism 
The question that arises now is whether the postmodern critique of objectivity and             
neutrality has perhaps outlived itself? For Balsom, this seems to be the case. In light               
of the events that have testified to the post-truth era, she argues, the once              
progressive postmodern suspicion of truth has evolved into the very rules and logics             
that govern our ways of knowing and thinking (Balsom 2017b). Simply put, the             
“post-truth politics” has taken on the status of a politics of truth in our current               
moment. In consequence, the postmodern suspicion toward truth has evolved from a            
critique to a reinforcement of a hegemonic regime of knowledge production. 
In ​Truth and Power​, Foucault maintains that the role of the intellectual is to              
demonstrate the potential for a new politics of truth (Foucault 1979). The goal, he              
claims, is to disentangle truth from power and hegemony through critique (Foucault            
1997, 28–31, 1979). Foucault defines critique as “an investigation into the legitimacy            
of historical modes of knowing” (Foucault 1997, 49). What this implies is an             
analytical procedure in which we ask ourselves the questions of the limits of our              
most certain ways of knowing. Furthermore, he claims, critique is not a search for              
universal structures but historically dependent (Foucault 1997, 125). Building on          
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experience a crisis within our epistemological field: “[…] it is from this condition, the              
tear in the fabric of our epistemological web, that the practice of critique emerges,              
with the awareness that no discourse is adequate here or that our reigning             
discourses have produced an impasse” (Butler 2006). 
  
As a form of critique, documentary is also relational and historically dependent.            
When Trinh and Williams called for “a new documentary” or ​no documentary at all​,              
they wrote against an engrained orthodoxy in which documentary images were often            
tied to domination and spectacle (Trinh 2013; Williams 1993). However, as we have             
seen, the strategies they advocated for are the new orthodoxy. Thus, according to             
Balsom, the reflexive strategy, yesterday’s vanguard move, has fossilized into          
text-book knowledge that fails to respond to the present state of emergency (Balsom             
2017b; Balsom and Peleg 2016, 15). It is therefore time to interrogate the             
contemporary efficacy of putting documentary’s claim to actuality under erasure and           
to re-evaluate the criteria we use to judge what we see as vanguard. What Balsom               
calls for are new ways of thinking about the relationship between reality and form in               
ways that accord primacy to lived reality while maintaining the necessary critique of             
objectivity and transparency (Balsom 2017b; Balsom and Peleg 2016, 13–15). 
In his much discussed 2004 article in ​Critical Inquiry​, Bruno Latour, who himself has              
dedicated most of his career to problematizing the construction of facts, expresses            
doubts about proceeding too far down the path of questioning objectivity and the             
production of objective facts, by suggesting that the critical spirit of postmodern            
philosophy has run out of steam​[10] (Latour 2004). Latour reflexively asks whether he             
and other postmodern philosophers went too far in their attempt to reveal the             
constructedness of “prematurely naturalized objectified facts” (Latour 2004, 227); if,          
by attacking rationalism, they contributed to a situation where we no longer need to              
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Latour’s critique of critique is a part of a broader tendency within academia and the               
humanities in recent decades in which it has become common to be critical towards              
critique, especially in its Marxist, Freudian or Nietzschean incarnation (Bolt 2016;           
Felski 2011). As Rita Felski notes, the gestures of demystification and exposure            
have become a “taken-for-granted methodological norm” in literary studies (Felski          
2011, 231). According to Felski, this ​hermeneutics of suspicion (a term she borrows             
from Paul Ricoeur) characterizes a range of current approaches that, despite their            
differences in focus and method, share the conviction that the most rigorous reading             
of a text “is to critique it by underscoring what it does not know and cannot                
understand”. The danger of this tendency, she claims, is that suspicion becomes            
banality deprived of its former critical potential​[11]​. 
Yet, while Latour's argument has been greatly discussed across the humanities, I            
find that it is worth revisiting his arguments in light of the present moment of               
post-truth. The article was published concurrently with the invasion of Iraq and the             
debate regarding the alleged existence of “weapons of mass destruction” which           
turned out not to exist (National Security Archive 2004). Taking this into account, the              
context of the article tellingly resonates with the fabrication of facts going on today in               
contemporary politics as well as the widespread notion that poststructuralist thinking           
(to some degree) laid the groundwork for our current epistemological crisis​[12]           
(Scruton 2017; Calcutt 2016; Cadwalladr 2017). 
Writing before the declaration of the emergence of the post-truth era, the question for              
Latour is whether we can distinguish between conspiracists and a popularized           
version of social critique. In both cases, he claims, we have learned to become              
suspicious of everything people say and to regard every statement as rhetoric hiding             
the real motives of the speaking agent (Latour 2004, 228–29). Thus, Latour suggests             
that the postmodernist structures of explanation, resorting to power, language and           
discourse, have outlived their usefulness to a point at which they are now feeding              
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program never landed on the moon, that the Twin Towers were not destroyed by              
hijacked airplanes​[13] and that global warming is a hoax ​(Latour 2004, 226, 228). At              
this time, Latour argues, the danger is no longer coming from ideological arguments             
posing as matters of fact but from “an excessive distrust of good matters of fact               
disguised as bad ideological biases!” (Latour 2004, 227). 
For Latour, the postmodern critical spirit has cultivated a belief that the only way to               
criticize facts is by moving away from them by pointing ​towards the conditions for              
their construction (Latour 2004, 231). While enlightenment and poststructuralist         
critique once profited from the critical descriptive tools that were effective for            
exposing powers and illusions, the same philosophy, according to Latour, has found            
itself “totally disarmed” the moment matters of fact were debunked by the same             
critical impetus (Latour 2004, 232). Essentially, the effort has turned out to be off              
target, as the goal, Latour maintains, was never to move away from facts but to get                
closer to them: “not fighting empiricism but, on the contrary, renewing empiricism”            
(Latour 2004, 231).  
  
Already in 1988, in her highly influential article “Situated Knowledges” in ​Feminist            
Studies​, Donna Haraway warns us that even though the critique of objectivity has             
been necessary, going too far down the path of social constructivism will be to              
abandon our important claim on real, shared existence (Haraway 1988). Like Latour,            
Haraway notes that she too has contributed to a collective discourse that has offered              
a strong social constructivist critique of all forms of knowledge claims and            
“ideological doctrines of disembodied scientific objectivity” (Haraway 1988, 576).         
From this critical viewpoint, science is rhetoric for manufacturing knowledge –           
knowledge which leads to power rather than truth (Haraway 1988, 575–77).           
However, as Haraway claims, the problem with this critical inquiry, is that academics             
and activists, in their attempt to unmask power and truth, have distracted themselves             
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What Haraway recognizes is that feminism needs situated, objective knowledges          
produced under a doctrine of “feminist objectivity” that is markedly different from the             
contested notion of “scientific objectivity” (Haraway 1988, 578–80). As Lorraine          
Daston and Peter Galison have shown, the notion of objectivity itself is not a              
universal, timeless and transgressive scientific virtue (Daston and Galison 2010).          
Rather, they have shown, the notion of objectivity is itself historically contingent.            
Though their genealogical research, they demonstrate how objectivity emerges         
alongside the development of technologies for mechanical reproduction – especially,          
but not exclusively, the invention of photography (Daston and Galison 1992, 98).            
These technologies were thought to extirpate human intervention between object          
and representation and hereby to offer an "an objective view" of objects studies             
(Daston and Galison 2007, 10). Thus, objectivity comes to be conceptualized as “a             
view from nowhere” (Daston and Galison 2007, 51). 
  
What Haraway proposes is the foundation for a new critical practice that is             
characterized by a commitment to faithful accounts of a "real" world and our shared              
existence as well as an awareness of the historical contingency for all knowledge             
claims and a recognition of its own "semiotic technologies" for making meanings            
(Haraway 1988, 579). Whereas feminist constructivism, in the attempt to nurture and            
protect the sense of collective historical subjectivity and agency, has been busy            
debunking the idea of objectivity as “a hierarchical and positivist ordering of what can              
count as knowledge”, Haraway presents the opportunity for a feminist objectivity           
which is at least partially shareable, communicable and transmissible, about a world            
that is in some sense “real” and out there for us to experience. A “partial, locatable                
critical knowledge sustaining the possibility of webs of connections called solidarity in            
politics and shared conversations in epistemology” (Haraway 1988, 584). 
Sixteen years later, Latour reiterates this call for a new descriptive tool whose import              
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can easily dismiss certain conspiracy theories (and should still maintain a           
deconstructionist attitude towards these), some objects, like the laws of gravitation or            
the desires we feel, are, according to Latour, “too strong” to be dismissed as              
ideology or fetishes and “too weak” to be treated as “indisputable causal            
explanations of some unconscious action.” (Latour 2004, 242-243). Thus, rather than           
deconstructing these objects, the task of the critic is to acknowledge their            
constructedness as something fragile and therefore in need of care and caution            
(Latour 2004, 246). 
If we take Haraway and Latour's reflections into consideration, we might argue that             
the best response to our current epistemological crisis is, therefore, a critical            
practice, rooted in a reinvented empiricist approach; a “feminist empiricism”          
(Haraway 1988, 580) or “a second empiricism” (Latour 2004, 232). That is, in order              
to address the epistemological crisis, it is no longer sufficient to expose the historical              
contingency and modes of construction for everything. Rather, as Haraway claims,           
“we have to insist on a better account of the world” (Haraway 1988, 579). An account                
that is rooted in a new empiricist ontology and epistemology that acknowledges the             
world ​is and, by attending to it, we can create new visibilities and subvert dominant               
narratives. 
 
The Persistence of Observation 
As part of her new empiricism, Haraway proposes to reclaim vision and recapture it              
from the claims for scientific objectivity (Haraway 1988, 581ff). Historically,          
visualizing practices have been tied to modes of violence and dominance in the             
service of science, militarism, capitalism, colonialism and male supremacy. For this           
reason, Haraway notes, vision has been subjected to heavy criticism in feminist            
discourse (Haraway 1988, 581). Vision, she notes, is essentially a question of the             
power to see (Haraway 1988, 585). Thus, she argues, we need to reclaim the sense               
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to give up the idea of disembodied vision, i.e. “the conquering gaze from nowhere”              
that has provided us with disembodied imagery from outer space to the inside of our               
cells (Haraway 1988, 581). This vision (the “canibaleye” that “fucks the world”)            
represents an ideology of a direct, devouring, reproductive and unrestricted vision           
which, according to Haraway, is essentially an illusion or a god trick (Haraway 1988,              
581). Feminist objectivity, Haraway claims, is not unlimited and omnipotent or           
detached but emerges out of the recognition of “particular and specific embodiment”            
(Haraway 1988, 582). By embodiment Haraway is not only talking about organic            
vision, but vison from a particular, situated perspective. Thus, she writes: “Feminist            
objectivity is about limited location and situated knowledges, not about          
transcendence and splitting of subject and object. It allows us to become answerable             
for what we learn how to see” (Haraway 1988, 583). Unlike scientific objectivity (cf.              
Dalston and Galison), feminist objectivity abandons the notion of passive vision and            
the idea of an unmediated photograph or passive camera obscura. Rather, Haraway            
claims, there are only “highly specific visual possibilities, each with a wonderfully            
detailed, active, partial way of organizing worlds” (Haraway 1988, 583). Drawing on            
Haraway's notion of persistence of vision, we could argue that observation and            
lens-based capture also need to be reclaimed in the context of documentary cinema.             
Because documentaries, as emphasized in Nichols’ generous definition, “address         
the world in which we live rather than a world imagined by the filmmaker” (Nichols               
2017, xi), the current epistemological crisis seems to accord documentary a new            
urgency as a means of “getting to know the world effectively” (Haraway 1988, 577). 
Thus, while the observational documentary’s claim to the capture of life holds the risk              
of domination, it is not the only possibility. As Grimshaw notes, some of the earliest               
attempts to identify the key elements constituting an observational approach display           
an awareness of the critical parameters of observational cinema​[14] (Grimshaw and           
Ravetz 2009, 3–23; Grimshaw 2013). One of the key points in Colin Young’s seminal              
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(Young 2009, 100–101). Film, he states, can never be objective. It can, however,             
objectify (Young 2009, 100). Young describes observational cinema as a practical           
approach to overcome this problem. A part of this approach is to distinguish between              
the camera as a surveyor’s instrument and “a method of examining human            
behaviour and human relationships in detail” (Young 2009, 101). Rather than ​a view             
from nowhere​, Young is suggesting a version of observational cinema as ​a view from              
somewhere​. Attuned to a new empiricist approach, Balsom suggests that, in a time             
of crisis, looking closer at the world today may be a really important thing to do                
(Balsom 2017b). With its privileging of the contingency of lens-based capture and its             
insistence on the empirical world as something we can attend to, the observational             
mode, Balsom claims, has reappeared as a radial response to the current crisis of              
truth production (Balsom 2017b). 
  
Observational Practices in Contemporary Documentary Cinema 
Following the “return of the real” in contemporary art (Foster 1996), documentary            
practices have been a prominent feature of contemporary at least since Okwui            
Enwezor’s ​Documenta 11 ​in 2002 (Lind and Steyerl 2008, 11; Takahashi 2015;            
Enwezor 2004). Although this shift has been associated with a rise of a formally              
reflexive and speculative form of documentary (Takahashi 2015, 188–89; Lind and           
Steyerl 2008, 14–15), the “documentary turn” in contemporary art also gave rise to a              
new strain of artistic documentary practices readmitted to the observational mode at            
the intersection of art and cinema (Dallas 2014; Sicinski 2017; Unger 2017;            
MacDonald 2013; Balsom 2017b, 2017a). The rejuvenated commitment to the          
observational mode and lens-based capture is found in a broad range of works from              
filmmakers and artists like Wang Bing, Rosalind Nashashibi, Ben Rivers, Ben           
Russel, Salomé Lamas, Eric Badelaire and Kevin Jerome Everson. As Balsom           
notes, these works leave behind a “pedagogy of suspicion” (Balsom 2017b, n.p.).            
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modes, these practices uses the power of lens-based capture to look at the facticity              
of phenomenal reality. Per Balsom, these contemporary practises ”assert the          
importance of the nonhuman automatism of the camera as a means for encountering             
the world” (Balsom 2017b, n.p.). 
An example of one of these films that uses lens-based capture to engage in a new                
sphere of representation is Lucien Castaing-Taylor and Véréna Paravel’s ​Leviathan          
(2012). The film opens with a brief textual prologue – a biblical quote from the               
description of the sea monster, ​Leviathan​, in the Book of Job. Hereafter, the film              
presents the viewer with a cacophonous blackness accompanied by amplified          
sounds of machinery, the clanking of metal chains, creaking winches, the ocean            
waves crashing against the sides of the ship and gusts of wind. With no expository               
voice over, no establishing shots, the film gradually reveals itself as an observational             
recording of modern industrial fishing, captured through a plethora of GoPro and            
consumer DSRL cameras on board a fishing trawler at night. 
The disorienting aesthetics of ​Leviathan raise questions that are pertinent to           
understand documentary's intervention in a crisis of truth. With its surreal and yet             
tangible aesthetics, it generates a new image of reality, while respecting the reality of              
the objects in the image. Coming out of Harvard’s Sensory Ethnography Lab (SEL             
hereafter), ​Leviathan represents a strain of films that, as stated on SEL’s website,             
strives for “innovative combinations of aesthetics and ethnography” and “encourages          
attention to the many different dimensions of social experience and subjectivity that            
may only with difficulty be rendered with world alone” (“Sensory Ethnography Lab ::            
Harvard University” n.d.). Furthermore, SEL is concerned with the effort “not to            
analyse, but to actively produce aesthetic experience, and of kinds that reflect and             
draw on but do not necessarily clarify or leave one with the illusion of ‘understanding’               
everyday experience.” (“Sensory Ethnography Lab :: Harvard University” n.d.). In         
other words, the films coming out of SEL prioritize experience over explanation and             
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and the senses in the engagement with and representation of the empirical world             
resonates with Haraway’s privileging of the body as a means for obtaining a feminist              
objective, situated knowledges (Haraway 1988). 
Another example of a contemporary observational documentary is Kevin Jerome          
Everson’s ​Tonsler Park (2017). Shot on 16 mm black and white film at various              
different polling stations in the African American neighbourhood, Tonsler Park, in           
Charlottesville, Virginia during the last day of the 2016 US presidential election – the              
first election following Barack Obama’s two terms and an election that may put             
Donald Trump into office – the film depicts the quotidian act of voting seen from               
within a black community. In this eighty-minute portrait of workers at a polling station,              
we watch the poll workers perform their job as people arrive; ballots are handed out,               
questions are answered amid a buzz of friendly, but formal, chatter between the             
volunteers and the people who have come to place their votes. With its calm images               
of African Americans exercizing their right to vote, ​Tonsler Park is a powerful counter              
image to the spectacle of white supremacy that has now become inseparable with             
the image of Charlottesville after the white supremacist rally that took place in             
Charlottesville in August 2017. 
The film consists of about 20 shots, some of which are brief, while others last almost                
eleven minutes, i.e. the length of a standard roll of 16 mm film shooting at 25 frames                 
per second. With every new person on the screen, we spend several minutes at a               
time studying their faces and gesture. Throughout the film, the people who have             
come to vote keep passing in front of the camera, creating a grey and black flicker of                 
human bodies that, every now and then, blocks our view. By his lingering and              
partially concealed gaze at the world of people performing their democratic duties,            
Everson creates a film that refrains from any notions of immediacy or mastery and              
yet demands that we pay attention. Through a strategy of attunement and opacity,             
the film addresses the ambivalence of visibility for a population that is more             
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invisible (hooks 2015; Glissant 1997). Given the cynicism of the contemporary           
political landscape initiated on the day of the film, Everson’s attentive portrait of             
democracy at work becomes particularly affecting and effective. 
We may read ​Tonsler Park as an attempt to investigate labour through an ethics of               
attunement that makes no claim to any notions of “fly-on-the-wall” immediacy or            
objectivity. With very little use of montage, the film provides an assertion of the              
preservation of the continuity of time, hereby facilitating the viewers’ encounter with            
contingency. Through the use of asynchronous sound and the partial concealment of            
the action by the bodies of people crisscrossing in front of the camera, Everson              
reflexively breaks away from any possible impression of total capture: what we are             
seeing is only a slice of reality. Yet, this slice is invested with great importance. 
  
Towards an Integral Realism 
With their lingering images, contemporary observational documentaries like        
Leviathan ​and ​Tonsler Park ​prioritize image over discourse, while being aware of            
their own meditation. By combining an empiricist ontology with a reflexive           
epistemology, I believe these films illustrate what Grimshaw has labelled a “Bazinian            
Turn” in documentary filmmaking (Grimshaw 2013). Resonating with Bazin’s         
ontology of the photographic image, these observational approaches use the filmic           
image as “the connective tissue” to an empirical reality (Marks 2010, 140), while             
displaying a formal awareness that “cinema is also a language” (Bazin 2005a, 17). 
Like the observational documentary, Bazin’s writing has often been considered a           
naïve approach to cinema and reality (see e.g. C. Williams 1973). However, as a              
new empiricism is materializing, many of his critical concepts have been revisited            
and revived (see i.e. Rifkin 2011; Joret 2015; Andrew and Joubert- Laurencin 2011;             
Rosen 2001). What I take from Bazin is an ontology of cinema, rooted in an ontology                
of the photographic image, in which cinema offers a reparative relation to an             
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relationship between the photograph and the object as a physical bond between            
image and object, which exists independently of the photograph's rendering of visual            
information: 
  
The photographic image is the object itself, the object freed from the conditions             
of time and space that govern it. No matter how fuzzy, distorted, or discolored,              
no matter how lacking in documentary value the image may be, it shares, by              
virtue of the very process of its becoming, the being of the model of which it is                 
the reproduction; it is the model. (Bazin 2005a, 14) 
 
From this quote, it is usually derived that Bazin’s ontologization accords primacy to             
the means of production over visual likeness. However, recent re-readings of Bazin            
argue for rethinking Bazin’s ontology argument as something more than simply an            
indexical relation between the photograph and referent (the object) (Morgan 2006;           
Gunning 2007; Joret 2015; Rifkin 2011). When Bazin writes that “photography           
actually contributes something to the order of natural creation instead of providing a             
substitute for it” (Bazin 2005a, 16) and goes as far as to state that the image “ ​is ​the                   
model”, he seems to be suggesting an ontology that is deeper and more profound              
than an indexical relation between the photograph and the object photographed           
(Morgan 2006, 450). In Bazin’s ontology, the photographic image becomes a           
reproduction rather than a representation. Bazin presents an ontology of the           
photographic image that goes beyond the limits of indexicality and technological           
determinism. Rather than a mediation on the mechanical or “automatic” properties of            
photography, I believe Bazin’s ontologization of photography and cinema offers a           
framework for thinking about how we may experience the presence of the empirical             
reality through lens-based capture. In contrast to the ontological uncertainty inherent           
in Steyerl’s argument, documentary value, for Bazin, derives from the ontology of the             
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including in his essay “In Defence of Rossellini” in which he states that “[t]here is               
ontological identity between the object and its photographic image” (Bazin 2005b,           
99). This, in the case of ​Leviathan ​documentary value does not only reside in the               
uncertainty of the images (mirroring the uncertainty of the world) but in the             
encounter, they facilitate with the world through their photographic base. As Stephen            
Rifkin concludes, Bazin’s ontology provides an “opportunity to reflect on the uses of             
representation, and thus on the many ways in which we conceive of our encounter              
with the world and with each other, and what we hope to gain from them”28 (Rifkin                
2011, 286). 
Paraphrasing André Malraux (“Par ailleurs, le cinéma est une industri”), Bazin           
finishes his essay “The Ontology of The Photographic Image” by saying: “On the             
other hand, of course, cinema is also language” (Bazin 2005a, 16). Hence, he             
reminds us how cinema moves beyond the mechanical reproduction of reality by            
emphasizing that, although his cinema is oriented by the ontology of the            
photographic image, it is not completely determined by it (Bazin 2005a, 16).            
Consistent with Blandine Joret and Tom Gunning, I will argue that the key to              
unlocking this dichotomy lies in Bazin’s mythical concept of integral realism (Joret            
2015, 159, 177; Gunning 2011, 123). Through the notion of integral realism, Bazin             
conceptualizes the bridge between cinema and reality as an infinite approximation.           
In maths, integration functions as operation of calculus (the study of continuous            
change) in which one attempts add an infinite number of small units to a whole.               
Applying the Newtonian logic of the integral to film, Bazin finds that realist films              
create an image of reality that is ultimately equal: these films approximate reality but              
never reach it. In other words, Bazin’s integral realism, ultimately, does not solve the              
dilemma between image and reality. Rather, it maintains this difference as           
unsolvable. The task for a truly realist cinema, then, is not to reproduce reality but,               
as we have seen, to recreate the world in its own image. Applying the Newtonian               
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associated with the Italian Neorealist movement; Roberto Rossellini, Vittorio De Sica           
and Luchino Visconti) create an image of reality that is ultimately equal: these films              
approximate reality but never reach it. While “pseudorealism”, for Bazin, aims simply            
at duplicating the world outside, integral realism aims at creating an image of the              
world that moves beyond individual expression. While lens-based capture, according          
to Bazin, re-presents reality to us, it also allows us to move beyond the concrete, to                
the larger historical and structural context. In ​Tonsler Park the images of the election              
officers’ faces move beyond their evidential quality. Watching the people steadily           
performing their jobs, our thoughts wander off: to the future outcome of the election              
(not yet known to the people on the screen), the senseless killing of black lives               
through by police brutality, the historical struggle for African American voting rights,            
the contrast between this quotidian scenery and the stereotypical racist          
representations of blackness as violence (cf. hooks 2015; Butler 1993; Reynolds           
2010), or the gendered and racialized dimensions of this type of manual, repetitive             
labour. None of these themes are induced directly into the film by Everson. In fact,               
any possible symbolism seems to be undercut, except from perhaps the folding of             
the American flags at the beginning and the very end of the film and the inclusion of                 
a Halloween poster in the background of one of the last shots, alluding to the               
election’s tragic outcome. 
As Alexandra Oliver argues, the reappearance of realism in contemporary art differs            
from classical notions of realism-as-adequacy (that any representation, to count as           
realistic, must have some kind of secure correspondence to its object) (Oliver 2014,             
10). Rather, Oliver claims, contemporary realist practices subscribe to an          
understanding of realism as difference (Oliver 2014, 10). Following the logic of            
Adorno’s identity-thinking (the process of categorical thought in modern society          
whereby we “identify” an object as a such-and-such we when encounter it), Oliver             
argues that our categorizations never exhaust the objects we conceive: “a part of the              




Nanna Rebekka Jensen 
Rehabilitating Observation 
4 - 24 (36) 








Accepting the inevitability of the world’s partial concealment, its excess and           
ultimate unknowability also entails embracing its partial knowability, its         
plenitude, its perpetual unconcealment. Discarding the dream of objectivity         
need not therefore entail a hopeless capitulation to fiction and fantasy.  
(Oliver 2014, 13–14) 
  
In their approach to the real, these contemporary observational practices embody           
this form of critical realism. For cinema, I will argue, this notion of a realism,               
conceived as merely consistent with reality, is parallel to Bazin’s notion of integral             
realism. Neither of these films assert any direct and immediate relationship between            
cinema and reality. In line with the new empiricism and feminist objectivity outlined             
by Haraway, these contemporary observational practices start with the         
acknowledgement that objectivity is always partial and situated; objectivity can never           
be objective. Accepting the ultimate unknowability and embracing its partial          
knowability, its plenitude and perpetual unconcealment, the new realism seeks to           
represent the real in ways that are attuned to the empirical world while remaining              
aware that its representations are always partial and fragmented. Rather than to            
despair and embrace uncertainty as the only epistemological strategy, these works           
consider the ways in which the incompleteness of knowledge is structured and try to              
present a less destructive way of relating to the empirical world and those around us.               
With a confident awareness of their own meditation, these films create aesthetic            
representations of reality that converge with our perceptual experience with reality in            
ways that, I believe, exemplify Bazin’s notion of integral realism: the production of a              
filmic reality which is different, but ontologically equal to the empirical reality, which             
gives rise to new ways of understanding our world. 
Together, I believe that films like ​Leviathan and ​Tonsler Park testify to the             
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assertion of the indiscernibility between fact and fiction has been appropriated by            
discourses of power, the manifestations of the world need our attention and care             
more than our suspicion. Rather than to reiterate the engrained idea that we cannot              
believe what we see, these films ask us to look closer at a world that needs                
witnessing; they present the world to our attention and, as Bazin would suggest,             
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[1] In his article, Greene describes a sudden rise of formally reflexive and             
performative documentary practices that seem to mirror the precarious status of truth            
epitomized by the rise of post-truth politics (Greene 2017). Among these films is             
Greene’s own ​Kate Plays Christine (2016), a documentary-thriller about the actress           
Kate Lyn Sheil re-enacting the life of the news anchor Christine Chubbuck in the              
months leading up to Chubbuck’s on-air suicide. 
[2] Throughout this essay, I use the term lens-based capture to refer to image-making              
technologies that use lenses to record images, i.e. photography (digital and           
analogue), video and film. I will mainly refer to lens-based capture rather than the              
concept of photographic or cinematic indexicality as, within media theoretic          
discourses, the concept of indexicality has come to represent the essential difference            
between analogue and digital photography or cinema (Doane 2007, 2; Dubois 2016,            
160; Mitchell 1992; Manovich 2002; Ritchin 1990). 
[3] Grierson’s review of Robert Flaherty’s ​Moana in N.Y. Sun on February 8th 1926              
has been designated as the first public use of the word “documentary” with reference              
to film. In his review, Grierson writes: “​Moana’​, being a visual account of events in               
the daily life of a Polynesian youth and his family, has documentary value” (Grierson              
in Druick and Williams 2014, 16) . 
[4] In Introduction to documentary, Nichols revises his taxonomy to include a poetic             
mode and a performative mode (Nichols 2017, 108) 
[5] According to Nichols, a cursory history of documentary representation begins with            
the expository mode which is succeeded by the observational mode that abandons            
the formal and didactic construction of the previous mode in favour of a spontaneous              
observation of lived experience. The observational mode is followed by the           
interactive mode (later renamed the participatory mode), whereby the textual          
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With the rise of postmodernism, the interactive mode is then replaced by the             
reflexive mode (Nichols 1991, 32–33). 
[6] However, as early ethnographic films like ​Nanook of the North (Flaherty 1922)             
illustrate, the documentary’s claim to truth and authenticity has never been           
straightforward (see e.g. Nichols 1991, 201–28). 
[7] In an article in ​Sight&Sound titled “Observation and Identity”, Roger Sandall            
introduces the term “observational” to describe a certain kind of documentary that            
focuses on the empirical, the concrete and the specific – something which stands in              
opposition to what he calls “interpretive cinema” (Sandall 1972). In a similar vein             
Christopher Pinney has noted how the indexical capacities of photographic          
presented photography (and later film) as a utopian anthropological document: “a           
vitrine filled with illustrative evidence” (Pinney 2016, 22). 
[8] I borrow the notion of a “bad object” from Erika Balsom’s article "From Bad Object                
to Lost Object: The Desires of Film Theory" in ​Spectator 27. In this article, Balsom               
frames her discussion around Christian Metz's conception of the relationship          
between theorist and cinema as "love object". The "bad object" / "lost object" pair              
references the psychoanalysis of Melanie Klein which Balsom does not engage           
directly with in her article, but which informs Metz's discussions in "The Imaginary             
Signifier" (Metz 2000). 
[9] For a thorough analyze on the racial aspect of the Rodney King Trial see Butler’s                
text  “Endangered/ Endangering: Schematic Racism and White Paranoia” (1993). 
[10] For criticisms of Latour's argument see e.g.(Keller 2017; Fleissner 2017; Foster            
2015; Felski 2011.)) 
[11] In her 2011 article “Suspicious Mind” published in ​Poetics Today​, Felski writes:             
“Unchecked by counterforces, locked into a complacent and self-confirming circle of           
argumentation, a hermeneutics of suspicion dissipates its problem-solving powers         
and loses much of its allure. It no longer tells us what we do not know; it singularly                  
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[12] The American philosopher Daniel Dennett has stated that: “what the           
postmodernists did was truly evil”, blaming “them” for “the intellectual fad that made it              
respectable to be cynical about truth and facts” (Dennet in Cadwalladr 2017).            
Despite the seeming controversy of Dennett’s essentializing allegation, he is not the            
only one who has pointed a finger of blame for the “post-truth” era of politics at                
postmodernism and poststructuralism (Scruton 2017; Calcutt 2016). On the basis of           
these propositions, London School of Economics arranged a philosophical forum in           
2017 titled: “Is Post-Modernism to Blame for our Post-Truth World?” (London School            
of Economics and Political Science 2017). 
[13] Here, Latour makes a reference to a claim made by Jean Baudrillard that The               
World Trade Center in fact imploded under their own weight, undermined by the             
nihilism inherent in modern capitalism (Latour 2004, 228) 
[14] In “Observation and Identity”, Sandall emphasizes that to observe involves a            
close attendance to the world while resisting the desire to control, circumscribe or             
appropriate it (Sandall 1972). 
[15] A note on further reading: The framing of the registration of the world as a                
practice of love is an attitude that shares aspects of Eve Sedgwick’s notion of              
reparative reading (Sedgwick 2003) In opposition to paranoid reading, Sedgwick          
describes reparative reading as a critical practice that seeks to repair damage and             
move beyond negative affects. I believe that an interrogation of Sedgwick’s critical            
practice in the context of this field of inquiry can provide further fruitful insight to the                
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